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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2023

Extended version: Tamarin-based Analysis of Bluetooth Uncovers Two Practical Pairing Confusion Attacks

Résumé

This paper provides a Tamarin-based formal analysis of all key agreement protocols available in Bluetooth technologies, i.e., Bluetooth Classic, Bluetooth Low Energy, and Bluetooth Mesh. The automated analysis finds several unreported attacks, including two attacks (reported by Bluetooth SIG as CVEs) that exploit the confusion of pairing modes, i.e., when a communicating party uses the secure pairing mode while the other one uses the legacy pairing mode. They have been validated in practice using off-the-shelf implementations for the genuine communicating parties, and a custom BR/EDR machine-in-the-middle framework for the attacker.
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Dates et versions

hal-04079883 , version 1 (24-04-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04079883 , version 1

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Tristan Claverie, Gildas Avoine, Stéphanie Delaune, José Lopes Esteves. Extended version: Tamarin-based Analysis of Bluetooth Uncovers Two Practical Pairing Confusion Attacks. 2023. ⟨hal-04079883⟩
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