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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2021

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination with Strategic Customer Targeting

Abstract

We analyze the impact of strategic consumer targeting on market competition in a two-period framework of behavior-based price discrimination. Strategic firms price-discriminate high-valuation customers and charge a homogeneous price to low-valuation customers, even when they have information on them. Strategic targeting questions the main results of the literature: firms do not compete for customer information acquisition and there is no consumer poaching. However, compared with information acquired from a third-party, strategic targeting using first-party data increases competition. As firms are developing sophisticated strategies based on first-party data, we argue that competition authorities should reconsider the benefits of targeting for consumers.
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Dates and versions

hal-03269586 , version 1 (24-06-2021)
hal-03269586 , version 2 (22-11-2021)
hal-03269586 , version 3 (12-09-2022)
hal-03269586 , version 4 (25-09-2023)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03269586 , version 2

Cite

Antoine Dubus. Behavior-Based Price Discrimination with Strategic Customer Targeting. 2021. ⟨hal-03269586v2⟩
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